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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
James Freeman proposes to classify arguments on two dimensions. An argument is 
“defeasible” if its warrant admits of exceptions, “conclusive” otherwise. It is “a 
posteriori” if its warrant has to be backed by sense experience, “a priori” otherwise. 
Freeman argues that all four theoretically possible combinations are actualized. In 
particular, there are defeasible a priori arguments; the generalizations associated 
with their warrants are synthetic a priori judgments of the sort recognized by Kant. 
And there are conclusive a posteriori arguments, whose warrants are universal but 
based on sense experience. 
 The point of Freeman’s classification is to provide a framework for assessing 
what he calls, following Govier, the “ground adequacy” of an argument: whether its 
supporting reasons, if they are acceptable, are jointly sufficient to justify acceptance 
of its conclusion. Exceptions to an argument’s warrant undermine ground adequacy 
if the argument is conclusive but not if it is defeasible. Analogously, attention to the 
extent and variety of observations supporting an argument’s warrant is appropriate 
for assessing ground adequacy if the argument is a posteriori, but not if it is a priori. 
The classification scheme thus implies and reflects a pluralistic approach to 
assessing ground adequacy. 
 
2. TYPES OF WHAT? 
 
There is much to agree with, and to reinforce, in Freeman’s proposal. But there is 
one major respect in which the proposal is misdirected. Freeman is really classifying 
ways in which reasons can provide adequate grounds for a claim—if you like, kinds 
of ground adequacy. His taxonomy does not cover arguments in which the reasons 
are inadequate. Further, arguments generally do not come with their warrant pre-
identified. The warrant must usually be elicited, with a question like “How does that 
follow?” And in general more than one answer to that question is defensible. Hence, 
we cannot classify arguments by their warrants. Further, arguments generally do 
not carry on their face an indication of whether their reasons support their claim 
conclusively or defeasibly. 
 One might be tempted, however, to use Freeman’s classification scheme, or 
any taxonomy of ways a conclusion can follow from given reasons, to classify 
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arguments indirectly, according to which standard of inference appraisal is 
appropriate to the argument. This strategy lies behind standard textbook 
classifications of arguments as either deductive or inductive, depending on whether 
the author intends (or claims, or believes) the conclusion to follow necessarily or 
merely with probability. Since arguers’ intentions of this sort are generally absent or 
unavailable (as are the corresponding claims and beliefs), such taxonomies are 
wrong-headed. Freeman’s proposed taxonomy laudably makes no appeal to the 
intentions (or claims or beliefs) of arguers as to whether the reasons support their 
claim conclusively or defeasibly, or as to whether the warrant is backed a priori or a 
posteriori. 
 An alternative way of determining the appropriate standard of appraisal for 
an argument would be to identify a scheme that it exemplifies that has an 
appropriate standard of appraisal. Modus ponens and modus tollens arguments, 
disjunctive and hypothetical syllogisms, and existential generalizations from 
instances, for example, are clearly candidates for appraisal by the standard of formal 
deductive validity, a species of conclusiveness. Arguments to the best explanation 
are to be appraised by their distinctive criteria, whose complete satisfaction still 
leaves them defeasible. 
 But this alternative way of classifying arguments by their appropriate 
standard of appraisal will not work, for reasons that Freeman admirably articulates: 
some commonly recognized forms of argument cut across the distinctions between 
defeasible and conclusive warrants, and between a priori and a posteriori backing. 
Freeman mentions conductive arguments, whose warrants are in some cases a 
priori but in other cases a posteriori. I would add that in some cases the warrants of 
such arguments are conclusive rather than defeasible, as when one argues from 
satisfaction of the relevant criteria to a classification of a bird as a reptile. Similarly, 
he argues that some arguments by analogy are defeasible a priori and others 
defeasible a posteriori. Still others, I would add, are conclusive a posteriori, namely 
those whose conclusion follows in virtue of an exceptionless but empirically 
justified determination relation, such as the fact that the first letter of a Canadian 
postal code determines the province in which an address is located. There might 
even be conclusive a priori arguments by analogy. 
 The fact that some argument schemes cut across the conclusive-defeasible 
distinction means that the project of using that distinction or variants of it as the 
top-level distinction in a taxonomy of argument schemes will not produce a Linnean 
tree-like hierarchy. 
 If one interprets Freeman’s taxonomy as a classification of types of ground 
adequacy rather than of types of argument, then the lessons for argument appraisal 
are somewhat different than the ones he draws. Rather than identifying an 
argument’s warrant as conclusive or defeasible and then adopting the appropriate 
attitude towards recognition of an exception, one should ask whether the argument 
has a covering generalization that can be backed up; let us call such a backable 
covering generalization a ‘valid warrant’. The first question to ask in such an 
investigation is whether the generalization is a priori, i.e. capable of being evaluated 
by reflection, or a posteriori, i.e. in need of empirical support for its justification. If a 
covering generalization proves after appropriate reflection or empirical 
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investigation to be a valid warrant, the next question to ask is whether some 
exceptional circumstance undermines or overrrides its authority in the case under 
discussion. The status of a possible warrant as a priori or a posteriori thus seems to 
be prior in the process of assessing ground adequacy to its status as conclusive or 
defeasible. So we might take the main distinction among valid warrants to be that 
between a priori warrants that are self-evident and a posteriori warrants that are 
empirically supported. We would then distinguish within each class between 
conclusive or exceptionless warrants and defeasible warrants that have exceptions. 
 
3. WHAT TYPES? 
 
Construed as a classification of valid warrants, Freeman’s taxonomy clearly meets 
the desiderata of dividing a genus into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
classes. A valid warrant either has universal authority or is subject to exceptions, 
but not both. And a valid warrant either can be backed a priori or rests necessarily 
on empirical support, but not both.   
 In my view Freeman has made his case that all four combinations made 
possible by his bi-dimensional division are actualized. There are indeed defeasible a 
priori valid warrants, i.e. warrants that are self-evident rather than backed by 
experience but that have exceptions. Freeman correctly includes in this category 
general evaluative propositions (moral, intrinsic, aretaic) that license drawing 
evaluative conclusions ceteris paribus from factual premises, as well as warrants for 
a priori analogies and for arguments to the best explanation. 
 There are also conclusive a posteriori valid warrants, of which Freeman gives 
perfectly correct examples: universal laws of nature and taxonomic classifications. A 
conclusion drawn in accordance with a universal law of nature obviously follows 
conclusively from the reasons given. And laws of nature require empirical support 
for their justification, whether by Cohen’s canonical tests or in some other way. 
Similarly, a well-constructed system of classification licenses a conclusive inference 
from belonging to a species to belonging to its genus. And such systems, if they 
classify observed entities rather than a priori constructions, require empirical 
support, both for identification of salient principles of division and for construction 
of the taxonomy once the salient principles are identified. Freeman’s proposed 
taxonomy is a case in point. 
 Two minor caveats. First, it would be better to describe the source of support 
required for a posteriori warrants as observation rather than sense experience, 
since empirical support is frequently provided, especially in scientific research, by 
instruments rather than human senses (Shapere, 1982). Second, the qualification of 
conclusive a posteriori warrants by the adjective ‘prima facie’, to indicate that such 
warrants may turn out in the light of further experience to have exceptions, is an 
unwarranted and confusing introduction of an epistemic factor into an ontically 
based taxonomy. In fact, all warrants deserve the same qualification: defeasible a 
posteriori warrants are just as subject to revision as conclusive ones in the light of 
new experience, and even a priori warrants are subject to revision in the light of 
further reflection. 
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 We inherit from Aristotle’s Topics (I.12) a division of all arguments with 
adequately supported conclusions into deductions and inductions. Freeman invites 
us instead to think of the two main types as conclusive arguments and defeasible 
arguments, each having a priori and a posteriori sub-types. Should we accept the 
invitation? 
 One possible response is to accept the main distinction but use the old labels, 
calling any argument with a valid conclusive warrant a deduction and any argument 
with a valid defeasible warrant an induction. This response is likely to satisfy 
neither traditionalists nor reformers. Traditionalists will object to the reformulation 
of well-established concepts, reformers to the misleading character of the old labels. 
Compromisers might favour keeping the old labels on the ground that they are well 
established in ordinary usage. In fact, however, the old labels are not widely used. In 
a Google search of phrases of the form ‘x arguments’, where ‘x’ is an adjective, 
‘deductive arguments’ and inductive arguments’ ranked 32 and 33 out of 86, with 
frequencies one-tenth or less of the six most common descriptors of arguments. 
(Details are available on request from the present author.) And instructors of critical 
thinking courses regularly find that students don’t come to their classes already 
knowing the distinction between deduction and induction; it has to be taught. We 
might as well teach the right distinction with new labels whose meaning is not at 
risk of being distorted by the tradition. 
 Another possible response is to accept the main distinction but question the 
need for the subsequent sub-division. We can divide valid warrants, whether 
conclusive or defeasible, into those that need empirical support and those that don’t. 
But what is the point of doing so? Here Freeman has a good answer. When we ask if 
the premises of an argument adequately support its conclusion, we are asking if 
some valid warrant licenses the inference. To ask if a covering generalization is a 
valid warrant requires looking to see if it is adequately backed. And, since we look 
for evidence if it needs empirical support, but reflect if it does not, a first step is to 
figure out whether it needs such support or not, i.e. whether it is a posteriori or a 
priori. 
 Another possible response is to propose a further division of defeasible valid 
warrants. Toulmin, whose concept of warrant Freeman appropriates, in fact 
distinguishes four types of modal qualifiers associated with warrants: necessarily, 
probably, presumably, possibly (1958). Defeasible warrants on this account come in 
three types: probabilistic, presumptive and possibilistic. On Toulmin’s account, 
some warrants license a transition to a guarded commitment to a claim, others to a 
presumption in favour of the claim that may be overridden by exception-making 
circumstances, still others to the conclusion that a hypothesis is worth further 
investigation. Possibilistic warrants in particular deserve attention: much 
preliminary argumentation in scientific research, detective work and other fields of 
investigation involves determining whether something may be the cause of some 
phenomenon or event. As to the difference between probabilistic and presumptive 
warrants, there seems intuitively to be a clear difference in kind between using a 
statistical syllogism to argue that Tweety, being a bird, probably can fly and using 
the Criminal Code of Canada to argue that a person possessing more than an ounce 
of cannabis presumably possessed it for the purpose of trafficking. The difference 
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however is not a matter of whether the classical probability calculus applies; it 
applies to neither of these arguments. 
 On the whole, Freeman’s classification stands up to these possible challenges. 
 
4. SCHEMES: INDUCTION, PROMISES, STATISTICS 
 
In his discussion of more specific types of argument, Freeman makes some claims 
that deserve examination: about induction, about the moral obligation to keep 
promises, and about statistical inference. 
 He identifies inductive arguments with defeasible a posteriori arguments, i.e. 
non-conclusive arguments whose warrant must be backed by empirical evidence, 
ultimately rooted in sense experience. One may question this identification. The 
concept of induction was introduced into the western logical tradition by Aristotle, 
as argument from particulars to a universal (Topics I.12.105a12). Contemporary 
logic textbooks follow Aristotle in regarding generalization from instances as 
inductive reasoning. Thus, if any form of argument is inductive, argument from 
particulars to a universal is inductive. But valid inductive generalization may be 
conclusive. For example, determination in an experiment of the boiling point at 
standard atmospheric pressure of a single pure sample of a liquid chemical 
compound is conclusive evidence that all samples of that compound boil at that 
temperature at standard atmospheric pressure. Further, like argument by analogy, 
valid inductive generalization may be a priori, as in the case of Socrates’ argument in 
Plato’s Euthyphro from what is true of carrying, leading and seeing to the general 
conclusion that 
 
if anything is being changed or is being affected in any way, it is not being changed 
because it is something changed, but rather it is something changed because it is 
being changed; nor is it being affected because it is something affected, but it is 
something affected because it is being affected. (Euthyphro 10c, Grube’s translation) 
   
Thus induction straddles Freeman’s categories. 
 Freeman endorses Ross’s claim that it is “self-evident ... that to make a 
promise ... is to create a moral claim on us in someone else”. However, he rejects the 
claim that this principle is analytic, i.e. true in virtue of what it means to make a 
promise, on the ground that the principle has exceptions. This position makes 
mysterious what sort of a priori intuition is involved in apprehending the truth of 
the principle. Further, cases where it is not morally wrong, all things considered, to 
break a promise nevertheless involve, as input to deciding what to do, the moral 
relevance of having made the promise, which might be explained by the very 
meaning of what it is to make a promise—namely, to commit oneself to do what one 
promises. Nevertheless, Freeman’s position seems correct. A more telling objection 
to the analyticity claim than the possibility of exception-making overriding 
circumstances is that there are cases where it is not even morally relevant that one 
has made a promise—namely, where the promise is extracted by coercion, 
inducement or threat. As to the source of our a priori intuition of the moral 
relevance of having made a voluntary promise, it seems to be not merely reflection 
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on what it means to make a promise, but attention to the whole practice of promise-
making and promise-keeping, including the fact that a person to whom a promise is 
made will generally govern their subsequent actions by the assumption that it will 
be kept. It is the practice of promising, and the possible adverse effect on others of 
breaking a promise, that makes promises morally relevant, not the meaning of the 
word ‘promise’. 
 Freeman makes a common mistake of treating statistical inferences used to 
calculate confidence intervals as inferences from the frequency of some property in 
a sample to its frequency in the universe from which the sample was drawn. In fact, 
it is an inference in the opposite direction, from the frequency in the universe to the 
frequency in a sample. To take an example where the arithmetic is simple enough 
for the reader to follow the calculation, if the frequency of a property in a universe is 
0.5 and a sample of four is drawn at random from the universe, then the probability 
that the sample frequency will be between 0.25 and 0.75 inclusive is 7/8 (87.5%). 
This result would be expressed in the typical way of reporting confidence intervals 
by saying that, 7 times out of 8, the frequency in the sample will be within 25 
percentage points of the frequency in the universe. The result can be arrived at by 
noting that there is a chance of 0.54 (1/16) that all four individuals will have the 
property and a chance of 0.54 (1/16) that all four will lack it; in the remaining 7/8 of 
the cases, either one or two or three will have the property. The reasoning here is 
purely mathematical, i.e. a priori, and the inference is conclusive. The figure deduced 
depends only on the frequency of the property in the universe and the size of the 
sample, assuming (as is never actually the case) that the sample is drawn at random 
from the universe. 
 
5. SUMMARY 
 
Freeman’s classification should be construed as a classification of types of ground 
adequacy rather than of types of argument. So construed, it does indeed cut nature 
at the joints, distinguishing warrants as either conclusive or defeasible and as 
backed either a priori or a posteriori. In considering a covering generalization of an 
argument, to see whether it validly licenses drawing the conclusion, one should 
consider whether it is properly backed, by self-evidence if it is a priori and by 
empirical evidence if it is a posteriori. And, if it has exceptions, one should attend to 
whether the case at hand is one of them. 
 Freeman is correct that all four combinations are actualized, and in particular 
that there are defeasible a priori warrants and conclusive a posteriori warrants. He 
is also correct in holding that some common argument schemes, such as conductive 
arguments and arguments by analogy, cut across his distinctions; we should add 
inductive generalizations to this list. 
 There are strong arguments against redefining the deductive-inductive 
distinction so as to correspond to the conclusive-defeasible distinction. We should 
throw out the old labels and use the new ones. We may need to recognize a 
distinction among defeasible warrants between those that make a conclusion 
probable, those that establish a presumption, and those that indicate that a 
hypothesis is a live possibility worth investigating. 
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